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Thought Experiments1 
 
Kimberley Brownlee and Zofia Stemplowska 
 
 
1. Introduction 
A thought experiment is, in one sense, just what its name suggests – an experiment in 
thinking. But it is thinking of a distinctive, imaginative kind that offers a potentially 
powerful investigative and analytic tool in mathematics, science, and philosophy. In 
science, thought experiments are a well-accepted, uncontroversial mechanism for testing 
hypotheses, and in mathematics, they are one of the principal tools for valid reasoning. 
They can build and destroy arguments. In negative terms, they can 1) expose a 
contradiction, 2) undermine a key premise, 3) reveal a conflation of concepts or 
principles, or 4) highlight the counterintuitive implications of an argument. In positive 
terms, they can 1) demonstrate the consistency or coherence of a set of 
principles/concepts, 2) highlight congruities and similarities between different claims, 3) 
reveal the scope of the application of a given principle, and 4) bring forth intuitions not 
previously considered, amongst other things.  
In philosophy, some thought experiments are highly influential, even famous. In 
moral and political theory, famous examples include the following:  
 
1. Philippa Foot’s/Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Trolley Problem: A runaway trolley is 
hurtling toward five people who are working on the railroad track up ahead. The 
driver can either continue onto the track ahead, thereby killing the five, or steer onto a 
second track off to the side on which only one man is working, thereby killing the 
one. Is it permissible to turn the trolley? (Foot 2002: 23; Thomson 1985: 1395). 
 
                                                 
1  We thank Adrian Blau, Cécile Fabre, Fay Niker, Jonathan Quong, Victor Tadros, and Lea Ypi for 
their very helpful feedback on this paper. We also thank Fay Niker for her research assistance. We thank 
the participants of the Oxford Political Theory Seminar (June 2010) and the Manchester Centre for Political 
Theory Seminar (October 2010) for their comments.  
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This thought experiment serves various purposes. Some argue, for example, that it is 
permissible to turn the trolley because the negative duty not to kill the five outweighs the 
negative duty not to kill the one. This experiment is discussed in a variety of political 
theory contexts, including in just war theory on the legitimacy of defensive harm.  
 
2. Philippa Foot’s/Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Trolley Problem and Transplant Case: A 
doctor can save the lives of five dying patients by killing one healthy person and 
giving her organs to the five. If it is permissible to turn the trolley, is it also 
permissible to kill the one to save the five? (Foot 2002; Thomson 1985: 1396). 
 
This thought experiment also serves various purposes. Some thinkers argue, for example, 
that unlike the trolley problem, it is impermissible to kill the one healthy person in the 
transplant case because the positive duty to save the five outweighs the negative duty not 
to kill the one. 
 
3. G. A. Cohen’s Camping Trip: Suppose that a group of friends go camping together. 
They could either contribute according to their abilities and resources, with the expert 
fisher going fishing and the skilled forager finding apples, and so on. Alternatively, 
they could each assert their rights over their own equipment and talents and use them 
to bargain with the other members of the camping group. Is it better to base a 
camping trip on the principles of market exchange and private ownership or on the 
socialist principles of collective ownership and planned mutual giving?  (Cohen 2009, 
3ff.).  
 
This thought experiment is used by G.A. Cohen as his starting point to challenge the idea 
that socialism is infeasible and counter-intuitive, and to consider whether societies are 
relevantly distinct from camping trips, or whether societies that cultivate the mechanisms 
to harness human generosity could be governed by socialist principles.  
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4. John Rawls’s Original Position: We are asked to put ourselves in the position of free 
and equal persons collectively deciding upon and committing to a set of principles of 
justice for society. To ensure our impartiality as deliberators, we engage in this 
process behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ that shields us from the knowledge about who we 
will be in the society and what advantages, and disadvantages we will have. What 
principles would we choose? (Rawls 1971). 
 
This thought experiment is used to offer support for a liberal-egalitarian conception of 
justice. 
 
5. Robert Nozick’s Experience Machine: Suppose that you could put yourself into an 
experience machine for the rest of your life, which would give you all the experiences 
you find enjoyable and valuable without your knowing, once you were in the 
machine, that these experiences were not real. Would entering the machine be a good 
choice from the point of view of wellbeing? Would it give you all that mattered? 
(Nozick 1974: 42-5). 
 
This thought experiment is used to challenge the claim that the realm of value is 
exhausted by hedonistic pleasure. Nozick argues that the realm of value and wellbeing is 
not exhausted by the pleasure of ‘experiences’; we care about whether our experiences 
are real. 
 
6. Robert Nozick’s Utility Monster: Suppose there is a person who gets enormously 
greater gains in utility from any sacrifice of others than those others lose in utility 
through their own sacrifice. Is it morally required or morally permissible to sacrifice 
these persons for the sake of the monster’s greater utility? (Nozick 1974: 41). 
 
This thought experiment is used to challenge the intuitiveness of hedonistic utilitarianism. 
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7. Ticking Bomb: Suppose that you are an investigator who has a suspect in custody 
who you know has planted a bomb somewhere in your city. The bomb will soon 
explode. Suppose also that torturing this person will give you the information you 
need to locate and neutralize the bomb. Is it either morally permissible or required to 
torture the person in custody? (adapted from Walzer 1973, 166-7). 
 
This thought experiment is used to gauge the permissibility of torture. (See the Appendix 
for other examples of thought experiments.) 
 
Unlike in mathematics and science, in political theory and in philosophy in general, the 
use of thought experiments is a matter of lively controversy. Two especially pressing 
objections against their use are the following:   
 
1. The Objection of Bias: Thought experiments both invite systematic bias and 
entrench existing biases; 
 
2. The Objection of Inherent Ambiguity: Thought experiments often are inherently 
ambiguous, leading to inescapably opaque judgements. 
 
These objections are troubling because they challenge the very possibility of making 
logically and philosophically respectable use of thought experiments. Neither objection is 
forceful in its general form because, if it were, it would impugn the less controversial use 
of thought experiments in mathematics and science and not just philosophy. These two 
objections, however, may be thought to target the use of thought experiments in sub-
disciplines of philosophy such as political theory and moral theory where thought 
experiments are deployed not only for conceptual and logical purposes, but also for 
normative and evaluative purposes. Using thought experiments in political and moral 
theory in particular may seem suspect because such thought experiments abstract away 
from and idealize real-life cases or even invent fantastical scenarios, but nonetheless 
purport to guide real-life behaviour.  
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The use of thought experiments in political and moral theory is also subject to 
further, less weighty objections. First, such thought experiments are said to be in poor 
taste since they often involve fantastic scenarios of suffering, death, and cruelty that 
trivialize that suffering. (Ironically, thought experiments of the past were also criticized 
for being too trivial: see Winch 1965: 199-200.) Second, they are said to impoverish our 
understanding of urgent problems, as they are devoid of rich social context (O’Neill 
1986: 12, 20-21 – but note that O’Neill herself does not attribute this feature to thought 
experiments in general, only in some contexts within political and moral theory). Third, 
thought experiments, such as the Ticking Bomb, are said to misrepresent the vast 
majority of relevant real-life cases and thus create the false impression that the world is 
simpler and more manageable than it is. These latter three objections can be set aside, 
however, because their force, while somewhat doubtful, could be granted without 
abandoning the practice of thought experiments in political and moral theory. They seem 
to invite theorists to engage in careful and tactful delineation of thought experiments 
rather than to abandon them altogether.  
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a guide for the use of thought 
experiments in political theory (although what we say holds more generally for normative 
theory). As part of that objective, we aim to refute the Objection of Bias and the 
Objection of Inherent Ambiguity against thought experiments in this area. A further, 
related purpose of this chapter is to flesh out positively the distinctive argumentative 
value that thought experiments have in normative theory. We begin by distinguishing the 
concept of a thought experiment from things with which it is sometimes conflated, 
namely, introspective psychological experiments and other argumentative tools that 
appeal to the workings of the imagination such as descriptive hypothetical examples 
(section 2). We then respond to the Objection of Bias and the Objection of Inherent 
Ambiguity, first by articulating and defending a set of necessary, formal conditions for 
formulating well-posed thought experiments in normative theory (section 3), and second 
by showing that these conditions do not preclude the use of thought experiments that 
involve practical impossibilities or imaginatively opaque components (section 4). We 
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conclude by highlighting the key ‘how to’ instructions for designing thought experiments 
in political and moral theory (section 5).  
 
2. Definitions  
Thought experiments have been characterized variously as devices ‘of the imagination 
used to investigate the nature of things’ (Brown 2007), picturesque arguments (Norton 
1996: 334), purely mental procedures that aim to reveal something about the relationship 
between two or more variables (Sorensen 1992, 186, 205), and judgments about what 
would be the case if the particular state of affairs described in some imaginary scenario 
were actual (Gendler 1998, 398). Our conception of thought experiments in normative 
theory is as follows:  
 
A thought experiment is a multi-step process that involves (1) the mental 
visualization of some specific scenario for the purpose of (2) answering a further, 
more general, and at least partly mental-state-independent question about reality.2 
 
The reference here to ‘mental visualization’ highlights the imaginative quality of thought 
experiments. They are not purely abstract or formal operations of thought. Rather, they 
are operations of thought structured to invite visualization. This does not mean that, by 
their nature, thought experiments cannot intelligibly and profitably deploy concepts that 
defy visualization, such as a square circle, a world with different laws of nature, or an 
episode of giving birth to oneself. Rather, the point in highlighting the visual quality of 
thought experiments is to note that they are not carried out purely at the level of abstract 
principle, but instead invoke particulars that are broadly irrelevant to the generality of the 
conclusion to be drawn from their use.  
 
2.1 Descriptive Hypothetical Examples versus Thought Experiments  
                                                 
2   We do not mean to settle the debate between expressivists/non-cognitivists on the one hand and 
cognitivists on the other. Even if normative judgments are ultimately entirely a matter of affective states 
(and hence are not mental-state-independent) we mean to signal that thought experiments aim to provide 
answers that at least appear to be partly mental-state independent.  
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The reference to ‘mental visualization’ above should not obscure the fact that thought 
experiments are only a subset of a broader category of hypothetical scenarios that involve 
visualization and imagination. A second subset of that category is descriptive 
hypothetical examples, which, unlike thought experiments, neither test nor contribute an 
independent step to a chain of reasoning. Purely descriptive hypothetical examples, such 
as ‘I have in mind here someone like Anna Karenina’, or ‘God is an example of a perfect 
being’, or ‘Annette is a person who is so poor that her cupboard is bare’, are elucidatory 
not argumentative. Descriptive hypotheticals and thought experiments have different 
functions. The former set the parameters of the type of problem under consideration 
and/or clarify the concepts at issue. The latter either are independent argumentative 
moves or test, and hence support or undermine, argumentative moves.  
Although we shall not examine descriptive hypothetical examples in what 
follows, it is worth noting two features of them in relation to thought experiments. First, 
descriptive hypotheticals can be proto-thought experiments, that is, sometimes they can 
be easily developed into thought experiments. For instance, once we begin to describe 
Annette’s situation to specify the type of poverty that we wish to examine, we can also 
use that description to test the acceptability of various responses to her plight. Hence, we 
might ask ‘Would we be prepared to leave someone so impoverished to struggle on her 
own?’ Our initial description of Annette’s impoverishment is not a thought experiment, 
but it opens up the prospect of posing questions about how to treat Annette. 
Second, unlike thought experiments, descriptive hypotheticals can assume what 
they are meant to illustrate. This would be a fatal problem for a thought experiment as 
part of a chain of reasoning, but not for a descriptive hypothetical as an elucidatory 
device. We return to this in section 3.1.1 below.  
 
2.2 Psychological Experiments versus Thought Experiments  
The second part of our conception of a thought experiment - that its function is to answer 
a further, more general, and at least partly mental-state-independent question about 
reality - allows us to distinguish thought experiments from introspective psychological 
experiments (or ‘psychological experiments’ for short). The latter are mental procedures 
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that aim simply to predict or to reveal to us our psychological/mental states. A 
psychological experiment asks such things as: ‘Can you make yourself believe that you 
are an oyster?’; ‘Can we imagine what it is like to be a bat?’; ‘Putting aside whether it is 
permissible, would we actually be able to bring ourselves to turn the trolley?’; ‘How 
would you feel if your child were killed?’ Psychological experiments are a distinctive 
kind of mental experiment in which the generation of a given mental state is precisely 
and uniquely what is being tested. For instance, when you ask someone whether, in 
circumstances C, she would fear an attacker enough to kill him, your aim is to ascertain 
through this test what her mental state is likely to be in such circumstances (or at least 
what she thinks it is likely to be). By contrast, when you ask an accountant what is 1236 
divided by 3, ascertaining her mental state is not normally the object of the ‘experiment’ 
(unless you wish to find out how she will react). The object of the experiment is to get at 
some feature of the world – the answer 412 – that is independent of her mental state.  
The commonly asserted claim that thought experiments, such as Ticking Bomb, 
generate strong intuitions invites confusion between thought experiments and 
psychological experiments because it can be read to imply that all that thought 
experiments are meant to test are affective (psychological) states. But the confusion 
between thought experiments and psychological experiments may also have a deeper 
source in that some thought experiments necessarily include psychological experiments 
as a preliminary step in order to reach further conclusions. This occurs when (and 
because) the variables that a given thought experiment examines include or depend upon 
psychological states, usually ones involving emotions (i.e. affective states). For example, 
take the following thought experiment:  
 
Attacker: Suppose that we see a person being attacked. And suppose that we are 
morally required to call the police when we see a person being attacked. If the 
police cannot arrive in time, are we also morally required ourselves to kill the 
attacker (assuming that our action will not threaten the institution of policing)?  
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In order to engage with this thought experiment, it may be necessary amongst other 
things to run a psychological experiment by asking ourselves if we would be able to bring 
ourselves to kill the attacker. (Would you?) We might want to ask this question if, say, 
we accept that ‘ought implies psychological can’, i.e. if we were psychologically unable 
to bring ourselves to kill the attacker, then, if ought implies psychological can, we would 
not be morally required to do so. Nonetheless, although this psychological experiment is 
part of ‘Attacker’, that thought experiment is not exhausted by the performance of the 
psychological experiment since the thought experiment requires us in addition to reach a 
judgement about a moral requirement. That is, it requires us to reach a judgement about 
what is morally required of us in this kind of case (and that judgement is, on standard 
objective conceptions of morality, at least partly independent of our beliefs as the agent). 
Given that psychological experiments in political and moral theory usually test 
affective states, one rough and ready way to distinguish thought experiments from 
psychological experiments in this area is to think of thought experiments as answering 
‘What is your moral judgement?’ and psychological experiments as answering ‘How 
would you feel?’3 We stress the distinction between thought experiments and 
psychological experiments for several reasons. First, it allows us to explain the nature of 
the intuitions that thought experiments are designed to elicit. Simply put, unlike most 
psychological experiments, thought experiments are not intended to elicit raw, 
unreflective intuitions or brute reactions. Their results can and often should be the fruit of 
reflection. Second, it has implications for the way in which data gathered through thought 
experiments can enter into normative reasoning. If what matters in thought experiments 
are not (or not exclusively) raw affective states, then there is more room for rational 
debate over the appropriate response to a given thought experiment. 
 
2.3 Simple Thought Experiments versus Complex Thought Experiments  
                                                 
3  One might worry that an expressivist or non-cognitivist would reject this distinction is a false one. 
But a sufficiently sophisticated version of non-cognitivism presumably accepts that, even if moral 
judgment is ultimately a matter of affective states, there is nonetheless a plausible distinction to be drawn 
between raw affective states and ‘gardened’ or reflective ones. 
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Within the category of thought experiments, there are some important distinctions to be 
drawn. The first is between simple and complex thought experiments. A simple thought 
experiment, such as the Trolley Problem, considers a single scenario. In political and 
moral theory, simple thought experiments tend to raise questions of whether some action 
is morally wrong, permissible, or obligatory, or whether some state of affairs is fair, 
equal, just, good, and so on. For instance, the Trolley Problem raises the question of 
whether it is permissible to turn the trolley and divert the harm from the five to the one. 
Oftentimes, the theorist’s intuitive, though not unreflective, response to such thought 
experiments is taken to be evidence for or against the hypothesis being tested in the 
thought experiment (e.g. that turning the trolley is morally permissible/required).  
By contrast, a complex thought experiment, such as the combination of the 
Trolley Problem and Transplant Case, considers two or more scenarios in relation to each 
other.4 This complex experiment – Trolley Problem and Transplant Case – contrasts (the 
simple thought experiment) Trolley Problem with (the simple thought experiment) 
Transplant Case. It aims to establish whether our normative answers in the one case align 
with our answers in the other case. In political theory, complex thought experiments 
serve various negative and positive argumentative purposes, such as exposing a 
disanalogy or confirming an analogy, undermining or affirming a hypothesis, revealing a 
conflation of concepts or principles, and bringing to light unacknowledged intuitions.  
 This distinction between simple and complex thought experiments is significant 
because some simple thought experiments need not satisfy the condition of validity (see 
below) that applies to all complex thought experiments. 
 
2.4. Contingency, Necessity, and Imaginability 
The final distinctions to highlight within the category of thought experiments relate to 
their degree of practical possibility and of imaginative clarity. 
Thought experiments can be more or less practically possible. The category of 
hypothetical is a continuum that includes both the likely and probable though non-actual 
at one end, and the extremely unlikely and even the impossible at the other end. The 
                                                 
4  Paradigmatically, complex thought experiments involve pairwise comparisons. 
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former can be described as contingently hypothetical (e.g. ‘Imagine that you are walking 
by a pond and spot a drowning child.’). Such hypotheticals can be structured around 
actual events, such as rescue boat operators in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina 
having to choose between rescuing the five adults on one rooftop or the three children on 
another, but they remain hypothetical in that they abstract away from the real case. One 
reason to construct contingently hypothetical thought experiments even when real world 
cases are readily available is that often the mention of a real world example invites 
protracted discussion of the facts, which can distract from the problem at hand. 
At the other end of the continuum lie thought experiments that can be described as 
necessarily hypothetical (e.g. ‘Imagine a spear flying toward the edge of the universe’) or 
at least necessarily hypothetical for us here and now (e.g. ‘Imagine a society that has 
eliminated poverty’). Thought experiments that fall closer to this latter end of the 
spectrum are controversial to some because they depart significantly from our lived, 
everyday reality. Being necessarily hypothetical in either of the two senses just noted is 
one way in which a normative-theory thought experiment may be said to be ‘wacky’.  
Another way in which a normative-theory thought experiment may be ‘wacky’ is 
in being imaginatively opaque. Robert Nozick’s Utility Monster described above 
involves an imaginatively opaque being since his, her or its pleasure in sacrificing others 
must be of a fantastic quality to outweigh the acute suffering of all of those who are 
sacrificed. As ordinary creatures with ordinary abilities for happiness, we are unable to 
imagine the kind of fantastic happiness that such a being would have to feel in order to 
outweigh the suffering it caused to those it sacrificed. (Parfit 1986, 389). 
These two senses (and sources) of wackiness – necessary hypoetheticality and 
imaginative opacity – can overlap but are conceptually distinct, since some cases of 
practical impossibility, such as my jumping 100 feet in the air, are nonetheless readily 
imaginable, while some cases of imaginative opacity, such as the experiences of 
sleepwalking and of insanity, are nonetheless readily practically possible and indeed 
actual. Commonly cited examples of wacky thought experiments include Rawls’s 
Original Position, Nozick’s Experience Machine, and Nozick’s Utility Monster. Since 
imaginatively opaque and necessarily hypothetical thought experiments invite the most 
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controversy in normative theory, they will be the main focus of our defence of thought 
experiments in section 4. 
 
3. Necessary Conditions for Well-Posed Thought Experiments  
What would a well-posed thought experiment in political theory look like? In this section, 
we outline and defend two necessary conditions for well-posed thought experiments in 
normative theory: philosophical respectability (section 3.1), and argumentative relevance 
(section 3.2). In broad terms, these conditions of well-posed thought experiments apply 
outside of normative theory, but they are particularly salient to normative theory. 
Although both conditions apply to both simple and complex thought experiments, the 
first condition places different constraints upon each type of thought experiment.  
These conditions are a non-exhaustive set in the sense that there are further 
conditions that any good argument must meet (e.g. clarity), which we do not mention, as 
we wish to focus upon what is special to thought experiments in particular. We believe 
that thought experiments that satisfy these conditions will be genuinely well-posed 
provided they do not fall foul of conditions that apply more generally to philosophical 
investigation.  
 
3.1. Philosophical Respectability  
This condition has two distinct dimensions, the first of which is non-question-
beggingness (section 3.1.1), which applies straightforwardly to both simple and complex 
thought experiments. The second dimension, validity, applies to all complex thought 
experiments and to some simple ones (section 3.1.2). 
 
3.1.1. Non-Question-Beggingness 
Thought experiments should not assume an answer to the question that they pose. So, 
when formulating thought experiments, one cannot assume that it is permissible to torture 
the bomb-planter in order to argue that it is permissible to torture him.  
Of course, it is not always obvious when answers are being assumed and 
questions are being begged. Consider Wittgenstein on the ontology of moral judgments:  
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Suppose one of you were an omniscient person and therefore knew all the 
movements of all the bodies in the world dead or alive and that he also knew all 
the states of mind of all human beings that ever lived, and suppose this man wrote 
all he knew in a big book, then this book would contain the whole description of 
the world; and what I want to say is, that this book would contain nothing that we 
would call an ethical judgment or anything that would logically imply such a 
judgment (Wittgenstein 1965: 6). 
 
Wittgenstein’s scenario presupposes that there are no facts in the world of the kind that 
he aims to deny and hence his hypothetical does not test the claim that this is the case. A 
conclusion other than that reached by Wittgenstein about the content of the book would 
involve contradiction. This would be a fatal problem for a thought experiment testing 
whether ethical judgements are facts. However, the example would be acceptable as a 
descriptive hypothetical that merely aims to elucidate what Wittgenstein means by facts.  
 
3.1.2. Validity  
When we first pose a thought experiment to ourselves, we should pose it as an open 
question, in the way that all of the thought experiments presented above have been posed. 
However, the question hopefully gives rise to answers, that is, the results of the thought 
experiment. Results are broadly of two types. First, they may simply consist in answers 
about what is morally required, permissible, etc. (e.g. it is impermissible to kill one to 
save five in ‘Transplant’). Second, they may consist in such answers together with a 
further hypothesis about why this is the correct answer (e.g. because harming is worse 
than not aiding). Simple thought experiments allow but do not require the researcher to 
propose the hypothesis. All complex thought experiments, however, necessarily contain 
at least an implicit hypothesis about what does the work in one of the simple thought 
experiments; the next simple thought experiment is then added precisely in order to test 
that hypothesis (see below).  
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Where a thought experiment contains or generates a hypothesis explaining our 
intuitive reactions to the scenarios involved, the thought experiment can be ‘translated’ 
into an argument. That argument must satisfy the condition of validity. In other words, 
the argument should not involve logically fallacious reasoning. Of course, what 
constitutes fallacious reasoning is a matter of some debate. The point is simply that 
thought experiments that contain and generate hypotheses can and should be held to the 
same standards of valid reasoning as conventional arguments, whatever those standards 
may be. Inability to translate such thought experiments into a valid argument would 
indicate that we are unsure either of what the experiment is supposed to test or of whether 
it presupposes what it is meant to reveal.  
An example of a thought experiment that satisfies the validity condition is the 
following from Peter Singer.  
 
The Pond and the Envelope: Imagine that you are walking by a shallow and 
isolated pond in which you spot a drowning child. You can easily save the child. 
Must you save the child? Imagine next that you receive a letter from a charity 
such as Oxfam asking you for a donation that you can easily make, to save a child 
(or, likely, many children) abroad. If you accepted that you must save the child in 
the pond case, must you also save the child(ren) in the envelope case? (Singer 
1972, 231-2). 
 
The thought experiment is used to show, amongst other things, that it makes no moral 
difference whether the person we can help is a neighbour’s child ten yards away or a 
foreigner whose name we shall never know, ten thousand miles away. 
Assume that, following Singer, you answer all questions in the affirmative. Once 
we form an intuitive affirmative response to the questions, this thought experiment can be 
readily translated into a valid, conventional argument as follows:  
 
 P1: We can easily save the child in the pond.  
 P2: We have a duty to save the child in the pond.  
15 
 
P3: The best explanation for P2 is that we have a duty to save others when we can 
do so at little cost to ourselves.  
C1 (the hypothesis): We have a duty to save others when we can do so at little 
cost to ourselves.  
 P4: We can send money to Oxfam at little cost to ourselves. 
 P5: We can save others by sending money to Oxfam. 
C2: We have a duty to send money to Oxfam. 
 
The condition of validity is satisfied here since the argument into which the complex 
thought experiment is translated tracks what the thought experiment was intending to test 
or establish and satisfies the criteria for a valid argument. More generally, of course, 
Singer would want us to see the argument not only as valid but also as sound: he would 
want us to accept that there is no relevant difference between the Pond and the Envelope 
scenarios in that both require the same moral response and both are explained by the 
same general principle (the hypothesis: C1).  
A thought experiment that does not satisfy the condition of validity is the 
following:  
 
A Sibling and a Stranger: Imagine that your sibling contracts malaria and can be 
saved only if you agree to finance expensive medical treatment involving a 
helicopter ride. You can finance it, albeit it will cost you a lot and you won’t be 
able to go on holiday for a few years. Must you do it? Imagine next that your 
sibling is healthy but you can finance similar life saving medical treatment for a 
stranger. If you accepted that you must save your sibling, must you not also save 
the stranger? 
 
This thought experiment can be readily translated into a fallacious argument:  
 
 P1: We can save our sibling at high cost to ourselves. 
 P2: We have a duty to save our sibling.  
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P3: The best explanation for why we have a duty to save our sibling is because 
this is our sibling.  
C1 (the hypothesis): We have a duty to save our siblings even when this involves 
a high cost to ourselves.  
 P4: Saving strangers would involve high costs. 
P5: The costs of saving the strangers would be identical to those of saving our 
sibling. 
C2: We have a duty to save strangers even when this involves a high cost to 
ourselves.  
 
This argument is invalid because, even were the premises all true, the conclusion need 
not be true: it does not follow from the fact that we have a duty to save a sibling at high 
cost to ourselves that we necessarily have a duty to do other things that are equally costly.  
The condition of philosophical respectability has the virtue of demystifying the 
status of thought experiments. If thought experiments can be represented as conventional 
arguments that meet the standards of valid reasoning, then it is unsurprising that they can 
act as solutions to philosophical problems. As we argued, this is the case with all 
complex thought experiments and with at least some simple thought experiments. To be 
genuinely well-posed, however, thought experiments should also be analytically useful to 
us and not corrupt our reflections. This is addressed by the second condition, the 
condition of argumentative relevance. 
 
3.2. Argumentative Relevance 
Thought experiments should be designed in such a way that we can focus on the relevant 
aspects of the scenario. We do not want our intuitive answers to respond to features of the 
scenario that are not part of the test and that thereby pollute it. For example, when testing 
a given hypothesis (such as a hypothesis about how we ought to treat strangers), it is 
necessary not to construct scenarios that more plausibly test an alternative hypothesis 
(such as a hypothesis about how we ought to treat our siblings), as we cannot assume that 
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they will elicit the same answers. For instance, the Sibling and the Stranger could be 
translated into a valid argument that fails to meet this condition:  
 
P1: We can save our sibling at high cost to ourselves. 
P2': The best explanation for why we have a duty to save our sibling is because 
we have a duty to save others even at a high cost to ourselves. 
C1' (the hypothesis): We have a duty to save others even when this involves high 
cost to ourselves. 
 P3: Saving strangers would involve high costs 
P4: The costs of saving the strangers would be identical to those of saving the 
sibling 
C2: We have a duty to save strangers even at a high cost to ourselves 
 
The argument is valid, but ridiculous: P2' misidentifies the principle to be derived from 
considering the case of the sibling. Similarly, looking at a simple thought experiment, if, 
in the Transplant Case, we forbid the doctor to kill the one person to save the five on the 
grounds that a doctor may never kill, then we are not testing what the experiment is 
meant to test which, among other things, is whether there is a normatively significant 
difference between killing and letting die (see likewise Rivera-Lopez 2005). By 
prohibiting the doctor from killing, we block the relevant test, as we allow her status as a 
doctor to infect our reflection upon the scenario. 
All in all, if we want to use our thought experiments as evidence for or against a 
given hypothesis (premise), we need to make sure that the results of the experiment 
actually support or challenge the argumentative move in question. The key question is 
whether it is possible to make this condition of testing the relevant hypothesis more 
concrete beyond prohibiting obvious shifts in focus. We argue that the condition of 
argumentative relevance translates into two weak constraints upon the design of thought 
experiments. The first requires that the experiment allow for rudimentary alternatives (the 
Rudimentary Alternatives Constraint). The second requires that the experiment not 
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encourage narrative-framing bias (the Moderate Narrative-Framing Constraint). These 
two weak constraints can be contrasted with more demanding variants, which we reject.  
 
3.2.1. Rudimentary Alternatives Constraint 
When we assume the absence of some (believed) necessary feature of the world, we 
should stipulate at least a rudimentary alternative. The aim here is to eliminate the bias 
that may come from continuing to assume that the feature still obtains. For example, an 
ancient philosopher who believes that objects can only move by willing to move, should 
not run a thought experiment like the following:  
 
Unwilling Rock: Assume that a large rock is not willing to move, but still moves. 
Is the rock to blame when it kills someone? 
 
The ancient philosopher who holds that willing is a necessary condition for moving 
should not run this thought experiment - without some extra stipulations - because he is 
pre-committed to the view that the object that moved must have been willing to move. He 
should stipulate instead a rudimentary alternative for how the object moved; for example, 
the object moved because it fell just like a human being might fall if pushed by a gust of 
wind.  
 
Unwilling Rock 2: Assume that a large rock is not willing to move, but still 
moves, pushed by a gust of wind (against its will). Is the rock to blame when it 
kills someone? 
 
Although we endorse the Rudimentary Alternatives Constraint, we reject the more 
demanding Fleshed-Out Alternatives Constraint, which holds that allowed alternatives 
must be fully fleshed-out and rendered comprehensible to us given what we know about 
the world (Wilkes 1988, 43ff.). Returning to the ancient philosopher, unlike the 
Rudimentary Alternatives Constraint, the Fleshed-Out Alternatives Constraint would 
require him to explain how a large, heavy rock can be pushed by a gust of wind. We 
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acknowledge that a fully fleshed-out alternative would protect us from certain biases, but 
the protection is too restrictive. It is implausible to hold that we really need a fleshed-out, 
clear statement of the alternative to the ruled-out feature of the scenario, in order to 
prevent the ruled-out feature from determining our conclusions.  
All in all, then, we accept that unconscious bias is real bias. But the possibility of 
bias is not a reason to abandon theorizing that might be subject to it. It is a reason to 
guard against it within the parameters of the case. We think that the Rudimentary 
Alternatives Constraint allows us to do so.  
 
3.2.2. Moderate Narrative-Framing Constraint 
We also support, more tentatively, the Moderate Narrative-Framing Constraint that 
guards against thought experiments that encourage narrative-framing bias. For instance, a 
thought experiment that draws its scenario from a well-known novel, event, film, genre, 
cultural myth, or icon can bring with it considerable narrative baggage in that the context 
of its creation has its own purposes that might subordinate or undermine clear reflection 
upon the scenario as a thought experiment. The problem is best explained with the use of 
an example that we owe to Roy Sorensen (1992: 264; see also Parfit 1986: 199-200; 
Coleman 2000: 58-60). Consider teleportation. Since it is almost exclusively encountered 
in the context of Sci-Fi adventures such as Star Trek and Harry Potter, its context makes 
demands of narrative unity upon our reading of teleportation scenarios. As viewers, we 
want to believe, for the sake of the story, that it is the same person who is teleported 
rather than a new person who is created by the process, and this may infect the 
philosophical use we seek to make of teleportation scenarios.  
Sorensen goes on to suggest less plausibly that Nozick’s Experience Machine also 
may be systematically distorted for a similar reason, namely, that we approach this 
thought experiment as a story about someone entering an Experience Machine and we 
find the possibility of such a story so unbearably boring that we reject it as a legitimate 
prospect. But, Sorensen’s position on this is implausible. There is no putative demand of 
narrative unity about Experience Machines that necessitates that an Experience Machine 
scenario be irretrievably boring. We can re-write this kind of scenario as an exciting, 
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Matrix-style adventure that eliminates the supposed anti-boredom bias. Our re-writing 
may introduce a pro-excitement bias in favour of the adventure, but that suggests that we 
need only find a middle-of-the-road description of the Experience Machine experience.  
The same is true presumably for most thought experiments. Narrative bias need 
not hopelessly infect thought experiment scenarios provided that we are attentive to the 
structure of the scenario and to the narrative assumptions that it can imply. Thus, for 
example, when we involve the Nazis to make a point against the permissibility of medical 
experimentation, we should be careful not to appeal just to the horrors that the mention of 
Nazis invokes.  
By endorsing the Moderate Narrative-Framing Constraint in the form given 
above, we reject the more demanding Extreme Narrative-Framing Constraint that 
requires thought experiments to be ‘maximally conservative’ and lie exclusively within 
the realm of contingent hypotheticals and never that of necessary hypotheticals, the 
spectrum of which we discussed in section 1 (see Haggqvist 1996: 147; Rivera-Lopez 
2005). The central idea behind maximal conservatism is that experiments that require us 
to depart from standard circumstances that we would encounter in our world will not 
track our reactions to the features of the case as set out in the experiment but will instead 
track our reactions to the standard features of a case encountered in the actual world. For 
example, when asked to assess whether to kill one to save five in the Transplant Case, we 
will ultimately not be able to take on board the stipulation that the alternative deaths 
really are certitudes, since in our common experience we may hope that the five would 
still have a chance of surviving since we never know for certain. This alleged limitation 
of our mental abilities calls into doubt the usefulness, or even the possibility, of wacky 
thought experiments such as necessary hypotheticals.  
But, while the problem of polluted intuitions is genuine, the assumption 
underlying the postulate of maximal conservatism is mistaken. The postulate rests upon 
the wrong-footed assumption that we are likely to reach better judgments when we 
operate within a familiar, real-life context than when we operate within an unfamiliar 
context. But this is not generally true. We might be better able to react only to the 
variables that the thought experiment is meant to test when the case is set in the context 
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that we do not normally encounter and are not familiar with, just as a non-native English 
speaker might be quicker than a native speaker to spot certain linguistic patterns in 
English, or a person unfamiliar with a given family’s dynamics might be quicker than 
family members are to spot instances of mental abuse and exploitation. A radically 
unfamiliar context may well make us more attentive to the features of the scenario that 
matter precisely because we are less likely to smuggle in additional assumptions. 
That said, we do not deny the potential legitimacy of the above worry about 
narrative bias. A thought experiment that asks us to assume a hateful baby or a saintly 
Mafioso might be hard to execute correctly. Similarly, we might also worry in relation to 
the ticking-bomb thought experiment that it asks us to assume what is very hard to 
imagine, namely that the torturer will be exceptionally well-informed and never tempted 
to abuse his power. However, thought experiments are processes that we can approach 
slowly and reflectively, thereby guarding against possible biases. If such biases occur, 
this does not rule out the use of thought experiments, but rather requires us to redesign 
them, especially as similar, if not greater, biases are likely to plague actual, real-world 
scenarios.  
 
4. Why Wacky Thought Experiments Can be Well-Posed 
We reject the possibility that a bar on wackiness is one condition of a well-posed thought 
experiment. In this section, we explain why.  
The ‘wackiness’ of thought experiments can be disambiguated into the two main 
categories noted in sections 1 and 2: imaginative opacity, and necessary hypotheticality, 
including necessary hypotheticality for us here and now. We hold that neither of these 
dimensions of wackiness bars thought experiments from being well-posed. Before we 
consider imaginative opacity or necessary hypotheticality, we need to address an 
objection that applies not only to these dimensions of wackiness, but also to something 
that is not at all wacky: contingent hypotheticality.  
 
4.1. Contingently Hypothetical Thought Experiments 
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Some critics seem to hold that we can conduct respectable normative theory without 
thought experiments. Such critics maintain that it does not matter that a given theory or 
principle would lead to counterintuitive recommendations when checked against a 
hypothetical scenario because all we need to know is whether our principles will serve us 
in our actual world (e.g. Hare 1981, 135 and chapter 8 passim; for discussion see Carson 
1993). The suggestion is that all that matters in normative theory is whether our 
principles perform well in the actual world, and not how well they cope with non-actual 
situations. 
Against this view, we offer two arguments. First, the performance of our 
principles in actual scenarios is not all that matters in normative theory. Frequently, 
normative principles are put forward as explanations of why a given course of action is 
right or wrong. Call such principles explanatory principles. Explanatory principles must 
be more abstract than the principles that bear upon a given actual situation if they are to 
explain our judgements in that situation. For instance, it is wrong to kill five patients in 
order to harvest their organs to save one patient because it is wrong to kill in order to 
save. Since such explanatory principles are more general than the situations that call for 
them in the actual world, they must be testable against all situations to which they could, 
in principle, apply. This means that they also stand or fall by their performance in 
hypothetical situations. This is one reason that political theorists often need to consider 
counterexamples, and rely upon hypothetical scenarios to expand their range, in order to 
challenge abstract principles. 
Second, even if we are not seeking explanatory principles, but merely principles 
that will serve us well with the problem at hand, thought experiments offer us a way of 
trying to resolve disagreement on which principles these are. All else being equal, it 
should count in favour of a principle that it holds across a wider range of scenarios (just 
as it counts in favour of a theory that it applies to a wider range of problems). So, thought 
experiments are important in normative theory because they can help us break ties.   
These responses might be taken to suggest that normative theories (call them 
applied theories) would not need thought experiments if they did not seek explanatory 
principles or were not challenged by other theories. But even this suggestion should be 
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resisted. That is, even applied theories that carry support need a method to discern 
whether the considerations brought to bear on a given problem (to reach an all-things-
considered judgement) are relevant from the moral point of view. For example, we need 
to ask whether it is relevant to consider such things as ‘this is my house’, or ‘this is 
extremely demanding’, or ‘she is a woman’, or ‘it’s repellent’, or ‘I would not do it 
myself’. Thought experiments offer an efficient way of testing the salience of such 
considerations.  
 
4.2. Imaginative Opacity  
Turning to imaginative opacity, this dimension of wackiness raises the following worry 
(Parfit 1986, 389; Wilkes 1988, 15ff; Cooper 2005, 328-347). Imaginatively opaque 
thought experiments fail to have an adequate imaginative grip and hence they pose ‘what 
if?’ questions that the experimenter cannot answer. The reason that the experimenter 
cannot answer those questions may be that she has no knowledge of the laws that govern 
the behaviour of the entity she is imagining. Or she may have knowledge of the laws 
relevant for predicting that behaviour in the actual world (e.g. the process of human 
birth), but those laws do not apply in the hypothetical scenario (e.g. giving birth to 
oneself). The fact that the experimenter cannot answer these questions is said to negate 
whatever argumentative value the thought experiment might have. 
At least two replies can be made to this objection. First, ruling out the use of 
imaginatively opaque thought experiments would be unduly prohibitive. It would rule out 
the use of thought experiments that expose certain paradoxes. For instance, it would rule 
out the use of a thought experiment used to show that causal paradoxes would emerge if 
one could go back in time and kill one’s father. But the opacity of the experiment does 
not stop us from pointing out the potential paradoxes. 
Second, it is not clear that being able to imagine all aspects of a given case is 
essential to run the thought experiment. For example, we (the authors of this chapter) 
cannot fully conceive of a being that is both a dog and able to talk, but we can still ask 
whether such a dog would count as a person. Likewise, we cannot imagine a utility 
monster that derives almost boundless pleasure from the suffering of others, but we can 
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ask whether such a being would be right to make others suffer. Recall that thought 
experiments are not ‘run’ (simply) to establish how we (the experimenters) would feel, 
but to establish what we may plausibly think, and hence we may not require a full 
character brief in the way that actors would if they were required to play a given part and 
to react ‘in-character’.  
 
4.3. Necessary Hypotheticals 
The worry that we do not understand the laws that govern some imaginatively opaque 
cases resurfaces in a form that applies also to necessarily hypothetical thought 
experiments. The worry takes the form of a dilemma:  
 
Thought experiments are useless because we either cannot set them up properly or 
cannot derive any credible conclusions from them. That is, either we are assuming 
a world similar to ours, in which case we cannot set up a wacky thought 
experiment at all (e.g. in a world similar to ours, dogs are not as intelligent as 
persons; there is no teleporting; etc.), or we are assuming a world that is radically 
different from ours, in which case we cannot know what to say about this world.  
 
(See Raz 1986: 419-20; Mulhall 2002: 16-18.)  
Why can we apparently not know what to say about this world? The answer 
relates to ‘semantic holism’ (see Sorensen 1992: 282-4). The idea is that our concepts 
developed to track our world, rather than the wacky worlds that we set up in our 
experiments, and wacky worlds cannot plausibly capture our real-life concepts. For 
instance, suppose that half of the standard tests that we use to determine whether a piece 
of copper wire is electrified give us a positive answer and half of the tests give us a 
negative answer. What should we say about this piece of copper wire? The answer, 
according to Nowell-Smith should be: ‘I simply do not know what I should say’ (1954: 
240; quoted in Sorensen 1992: 283). Now consider a wacky, normative-theory thought 
experiment.  
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Rich and Superrich: Imagine a world in which there are only rich and superrich. 
Is the inequality that holds between the rich and the superrich unfair or otherwise 
problematic?  
 
The answer, according to a critic of wacky thought experiments, is ‘I simply do not 
know’ since our concepts developed to deal with entirely different cases and they are of 
no use in radically re-imagined worlds. To give an analogy, paint colours developed to 
paint the British landscape are of little use in painting the African landscape, given the 
very different light of the two environments.   
However, this objection rests upon a mistake. It assumes that thought experiments 
ask us what we would say if our concepts were developed to accommodate the wacky 
cases as standard. But this is not what thought experiments ask us to do. They ask us, 
instead, to judge how our current, familiar concepts behave when exposed to new 
situations. To see this, first, return to the paint analogy. The thought here is that we are 
not asked to use the British paints to paint the African landscape; we are asked instead to 
use the African light to rule, say, on whether two identical-looking British colours really 
are identical. When we cannot easily tell if the colours are the same against the British 
light, we may benefit from examining them under the African light. We examine the 
value of equality by asking if we still value equality in such a context. If not, then we 
have reason to suspect that what matters to us in our ordinary context is not simply 
equality, but absolute levels of deprivation. 
  Second, consider another illustration of the application of our ordinary concepts 
to new situations. In Rich and Superrich, we do not ask what we would think if we were 
living in such a privileged society. Instead, we ask whether we consider the inequality 
present in that privileged society to be too unfair by our own, current standards. Pointing 
out that in a world with only the rich and the superrich, no one would care about equality 
(and that they may not even have a sense that they are unequal) is irrelevant to the 
question of whether we now see the inequality as problematic. (There is a wrinkle here. 
We may have a conception of unfair inequality according to which inequality is only 
unfair if the people subject to it consider it to be unfair; if this is so then, indeed, we may 
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be unable to tell whether unfair inequality characterizes the hypothetical scenario but that 
is not because the thought experiment is hypothetical and wacky, but because we do not 
have the relevant empirical data about the people we are investigating.) 
To conclude this section, we want to emphasize that wacky thought experiments 
are not, in fact, used solely to advance academic debates, which some might consider 
esoteric in any case. Testing how our familiar concepts behave when exposed to new 
situations is a common, undisputed, and powerful strategy in many fields, including one 
closely aligned with normative theory, namely, Law. It is routine practice in Law Schools 
to hold Moot Courts revolving around wild and wonderful cases so as to train Law 
students in the application of key legal concepts. And the application of such legal 
concepts as theft and property is viewed as no less legitimate when the parties are 
Martians stealing magic from Venusians. Moreover, in broad terms, real court cases are 
exercises in thought experimenting since both ordinary court procedures and norms of 
due process necessarily yield an abstracted and idealized presentation of the facts of the 
case.  
Ultimately, wacky thought experiments are not undermined by our inability either 
to imagine all of their elements or to anticipate how the concepts we are exploring would 
evolve in hypothesized worlds.  
 
5. Conclusion: How to Design Good Thought Experiments in Political Theory 
 This discussion has identified several conditions for good thought experiments. 
We conclude here by presenting these conditions as a set of ‘how to’ instructions for the 
design of good thought experiments in normative theory:  
 
1. We may stumble across thought experiments in film and novels; and life itself can 
generate situations that can be thought through as thought experiments. But, 
usually the impetus for designing them is that we want to test some premise in our 
argument/some hypothesis about a plausible principle or value. If so, the most 
fundamental question you should pose is this: What exactly would you like 
your thought experiment to test (to undermine or to support)?  
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2. Ensure that the thought experiment is relevant to what is being tested (see 
section 3.2). Try to design the simplest experiment in the sense of having the 
most parsimonious story (to avoid introducing distorting elements), but do not 
worry if the story is also wacky in the sense of being fantastical. (Our defence of 
wacky thought experiments is meant to set your imagination free). 
3. If your thought experiment involves a denial of a standard feature of the 
world (e.g. you deny that the police are uncertain whether they caught the 
right guy), hypothesize, even roughly, how this can be – what alternative 
feature of the world is present. (See section 3.2.1.) 
4. Be sensitive to possible narrative-framing biases, that is, to the structure of the 
scenario and to the narrative assumptions that it can imply. (See section 3.2.2.) 
5. Consider whether any imaginatively opaque elements of the thought 
experiment need to be imaginatively clear in order for the thought experiment 
to function as intended. (See section 4.2.) 
6. When constructing a necessarily hypothetical, consider whether the selected 
‘foreign context’ best serves to illuminate the features of our ordinary 
concepts and/or principles that are under consideration. (See section 4.3.) 
7. Ensure that none of the features of the experiment already assumes what is 
to be tested. (See section 3.1.1.) 
8. Ensure that the thought experiment, together with the hypothesis it is meant 
to support or deny, translates into a valid argument. (See section 3.1.2.) 
 
 
Appendix: Examples of Thought Experiments   
 
1. Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Famous Violinist: a healthy person awakes in a hospital 
to find that, unbeknownst to her, she has been connected by her kidneys to a famous 
violinist. The famous violinist will die unless she remains connected to him for the 
next nine months, just as a foetus will die unless it remains ‘connected’ for nine 
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months to the pregnant woman carrying it. Is the healthy person morally obligated to 
remain in the hospital with the violinist for nine months? (Thomson 1971: 48-9). 
 
The thought experiment is used to challenge the impermissibility of abortion. 
 
2. Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Loop Trolley: the two tracks in the Trolley Problem 
split, but then circle back to form a loop. Diverting the trolley onto the track with the 
one person will cause the trolley to hit the one and thereby prevent the trolley from 
continuing around the loop to hit the five. Is it permissible to turn the trolley away 
from the track with the five and onto the track with the one? (Thomson 1985: 1402-3). 
 
This thought experiment is used to show that, like the Transplant Case, turning the 
trolley in this case uses the one person merely as a means. 
 
3. Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Fat Man on the Bridge: the runaway trolley of the 
Trolley Problem cannot be stopped by diverting it, but can be stopped by pushing a fat 
man off a bridge onto the track in front of the trolley, resulting in his death. Is it 
permissible to push the fat man? (Thomson 1985: 1409). 
 
This thought experiment is used to show that pushing the fat man uses him merely as a 
means and infringes his right not to be so treated. 
 
 
4. Bernard Williams’s Jim and the Indians: A jungle explorer Jim comes across a 
colonialist Pedro who has twenty aboriginal people lined up before a firing squad. 
Pedro offers Jim the privilege of killing one and letting the rest go free. Jim can either 
refuse the offer in which case all twenty people will be killed or he can accept the 
offer and kill only one of them himself. What should Jim do and how should he feel 
about his choice? (Williams 1973: 98-100). 
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This thought experiment is used to question the thought that a plausible moral theory 
must be consequentialist. Focusing only upon the lives lost, it seems that Jim must kill 
the one; but Williams argues that morality is not only about good and bad states of 
affairs. 
 
5. Robert Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain case: Suppose that basketball player Wilt 
Chamberlain attracts huge crowds to his games. He signs a contract with a team whereby 
he receives 25 cents for every home game ticket sold. During one season, a million 
people come to his games and happily drop 25 cents into a special box for him, thinking 
it well worth it. He earns $250,000 this way, a much larger sum than the average income. 
Is he entitled to keep all of it?  
 
This thought experiment is used to show that people’s exercises of personal freedom, 
such as choosing to pay 25 cents to go Chamberlain’s games, will disrupt a patterned 
principle of distributive justice, such as the principle that everyone should have equal 
resources.  
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